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Human smuggling reconsidered: 







Human smuggling – a complicated phenomenon 
 
Article 3(a) of the United Nations Smuggling Protocol defines migrant 
smuggling as a crime involving “the procurement, in order to obtain, di-
rectly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry 
of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a 
permanent resident”. This definition underlines that human smuggling is a 
transnational crime, but the emphasis here is on economic gain, not on vi-
olence or other harm to the smuggled person’s life, health or property. In 
the academic literature various authors have tried to narrow down the def-
inition of the phenomenon. Kyle and Koslowski, for example, put forward 
the following definition of human smuggling: “an individual’s crossing of 
a state’s international border without that state’s authorization and with the 
assistance of paid smugglers” (2011:4). Here again, no clear, direct victims 
are identified as an element in the definition. Attempts to clarify exactly 
what kind of crime is being committed in terms of victims, offenders and 
harm have rarely been successful. Human smuggling is still often linked to 
and confused with human trafficking, even though it is the aspect of ex-
ploitation that distinguishes the two phenomena. 
 In-depth historical and anthropological studies characterise human 
smuggling as a consensus between someone who, for a variety of reasons, 
cannot leave his or her country and/or enter another country on a regular 
basis and seeks help to be brought from one country to another; someone 
who is able to provide this type of assistance in return for payment, and/or 
someone (or several people) who can guarantee payment. The practice of 
                                                          
1  The author is Professor of criminology at the Willem Pompe Institute, Utrecht 
University, the Netherlands. 
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human smuggling is also directly related to the practice of ‘beating’ the 
existing migration system. All over the world irregular border crossing or 
other forms of illegal migration have been a response to restrictive migra-
tion policies and the obstacles created by policy-makers and law enforce-
ment.  
 Although we now know much more about the global practice of people 
smuggling, some authors maintain that empirical research on this phenom-
enon and the actors involved has remained scant (Zhang et al., 2018: 10), 
in contrast to the number of government reports and media stories on this 
crime of mobility. Many academic researchers and analysts have published 
critical studies on migration policies (Andreas, 2011) or on the morality of 
human smuggling (Aloyo and Cusumano, 2018), but these studies are 
mostly based on government data and media stories. Many ethnographers, 
on the other hand, have provided information on the root causes of migra-
tion and migrants’ travel experiences, but not specifically on people smug-
gling (Spencer, 2004: 302).   
 This chapter will provide empirical knowledge on human smuggling by 
analysing my ethnographic data on the smuggling of migrants from Turkey 
to the Greek island of Lesbos and by giving a voice to the people who 
underwent the process. This will offer some food for thought with respect 






I spent the summer of 2017, from the end of May until the middle of Sep-
tember, on Lesbos to study the consequences of the so-called refugee crisis 
as experienced by migrants, local islanders, NGO representatives and EU 
officials. My ethnographic research methods included participant observa-
tion and 66 open interviews with asylum seekers, local islanders and rep-
resentatives of government organisations, NGOs and law enforcement. 
Human smuggling, the focus of the present chapter, was only one aspect 
of a larger study I completed in 2019, titled Dynamics of solidarity - con-
sequences of the ‘refugee crisis’ on Lesbos (Siegel, 2019).  
 The extended case method was used to collect information from various 
sources (multi-site and multi-level ethnography) and it included different 
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sub-cases which provided many pieces of the puzzle needed to compose a 
complete picture of the situation in all its complexity (Marx, 1976). Human 
smuggling was one of these pieces and it raised a number of questions 





During the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015-2017, Lesbos, an island in the Aegean 
Sea close to Turkey, became the most-discussed migrant destination in the 
international media. Lesbos is one of the EU’s ‘hotspots’, where migrants 
are identified and given the opportunity to apply for asylum in Europe. The 
island’s infamous camp, Moria, where thousands of migrant are currently 
living in precarious conditions, has become a symbol of the EU’s failing 
migration policy (Siegel, 2018; Siegel, 2019).   
 Reading media and government reports on the mass migration to Les-
bos made me wonder why so many migrants were apparently willing to 
pay thousands of Euros to members of organised crime networks (i.e. hu-
man smugglers) to organise their trip from Turkey to Lesbos, only 12 km 
away. Why did they come at all, knowing that they ran the risk of either 
drowning in the stormy sea or being caught by the Turkish Coast Guard 
and forcibly returned? Why did these people keep trying to make the cross-
ing to Lesbos while being aware  ̶  as they must have been   ̶ of the condi-
tions in reception centres such as camp Moria, whose inhabitants were 
lacking basic needs and were suffering from illnesses, a general lack of 
hygiene and internal fights between different ethnic groups of migrants? 
They also must have known that it could take months or even years for a 
decision to be reached on their asylum application and that it was more 
than likely that they would be denied entrance to Europe. What was the 
role of people smugglers in their ‘adventures’ and how did these migrants 






People smugglers in the public discourse 
 
There are significant differences between law enforcement sources and 
empirical research on the phenomenon of human smuggling with respect 
to organised crime activities, the brutality of criminal smugglers and the 
vulnerability of migrant victims. Governmental and EU reports are often 
contradicted by ethnographic studies drawing attention to individual initi-
atives, community assistance and the agency of migrants themselves. The 
stereotype of smuggled persons as ‘victims’ of organised crime depicted in 
official reports is countered by stories (documented in academic publica-
tions) of the ‘winners’ who made it to their desired destination. The image 
of people smugglers, on the other hand, is a lot less clear-cut. 
 
Smugglers as criminals 
 
Most official documents tend to portray human smugglers as criminals 
who “exploit the desperation and vulnerability of migrants” (Europol, 
2016). On the basis of this assumption, Europol launched the European 
Migrant Smuggling Centre to “pro-actively support EU Member States in 
dismantling criminal networks involved in organizing migrant smuggling”. 
Official reports on human smuggling indicate that “in 2015 alone, criminal 
networks involved in migrant smuggling are estimated to have had a turn-
over of between EUR 3-6 billion. This turnover is set to double or triple if 
the scale of the current migration crisis persists in the upcoming year” (Eu-
ropol, 2016:2). And “more than 90% of migrants are facilitated to the EU, 
mostly by criminal networks” (ibid: 4). Europol predicted that these crim-
inals would continue to expand their activities, using vulnerable migrants 
for sexual and labour exploitation in the coming years “unless decisive ac-
tion is taken” (ibid:13). Human smuggling is hereby equated to human traf-
ficking, with the emphasis on the exploitation and victimhood of migrants. 
In the same line, the United States State Department refers to smuggled 
people as being “. . . extremely vulnerable to human trafficking, abuse and 
other crimes, as they are illegally present in the country of destination and 
often owe large debts to their smugglers” (U.S. State Department, 2017:1). 
In this document the line between smuggling and trafficking is not only 
blurred, but practically obliterated. 
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 The European Commission’s starting point is that “ruthless criminal 
networks organise the journeys of large numbers of migrants desperate to 
reach the EU. They make substantial gains while putting the migrants’ 
lives at risk” (European Commission, 2015:1). These smugglers allegedly 
treat migrants not as human beings, but as goods, similar to the drugs and 
firearms that are transported along the same routes. Although the docu-
ment’s authors admit that there are no data on the profits human smugglers 
around the world are making with their criminal activities, “isolated cases 
show that these are substantial” (ibid). One of the recommendations in the 
EU Action Plan against human smuggling 2015-2020 is to raise awareness 
of the risks of human smuggling to prevent potential victims from embark-
ing on a dangerous journey and putting their trust in cruel and deceitful 
smugglers who have approached them through social media (ibid: 6). 
 Similar ‘facts’ are presented on the official website of the United Na-
tions Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which explains that human 
smuggling is a transnational crime, in the course of which migrants are 
subjected to grave human rights abuses. The criminals have “tremendous 
power, while the migrants are left vulnerable” (UNODC, 2019). The po-
tential risks are specified: even if the journey is consensual, it can still turn 
into a nightmare. “During the trip, people might be squeezed into excep-
tionally small spaces in trucks or onto unseaworthy boats in order for 
smugglers to maximize their ‘cargo’. Migrants might be raped or beaten en 
route or left to die in the desert. Once they reach their destination, many 
find that they (or their families) are the victims of blackmail or debt bond-
age. The latter can involve migrants paying huge sums of money to crimi-
nals in order to settle near-impossible levels of debt out of fear of violence 
or fear of being deported by the authorities, which can result in them be-
coming victims of human trafficking” (ibid). People smuggling can also 
fuel corruption and organised crime. “There is evidence suggesting that, 
with the ever-growing interdependence of the global economy, the in-
volvement of criminal groups in the smuggling of migrants is on the rise” 
(ibid). However, no concrete empirical data or references to this ‘evidence’ 
are provided and the links in the text all refer to other UNODC reports. 
 This image of the smuggler does not only appear in official reports. 
Various researchers have reinforced the negative stereotype of human 
smugglers as violent, evil men (Kyle and Scarcelli, 2009) who have no 
qualms about letting their victims/customers suffer or even die (Human 
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Rights Watch’s Dispatches, 2014). Human smugglers are often presented 
as members of criminal organisations (Kaizen and Nonnema, 2007; Narli, 
2006; Saha, 2007; Schloenhardt, 2002; UNODC 2015; Sciopi and Ionescu, 
2016), as kidnappers (Walser, Baker McNeill and Zuckerman, 2011) 
and/or as synonymous with human traffickers (Aronowitz, 2001; Bilecen, 
2009; Lintner, 2002).  
 In the Oxford Handbook of Organised Crime (Paoli, 2014), the catego-
ries of human trafficking and human smuggling are discussed in one breath 
(Kleemans and Smit, 2014). Fortunately, the authors acknowledge that a 
distinction must be made and that there is growing concern about the op-
posing views on the difference between the two phenomena, as this creates 
obstacles for empirical research (ibid: 397). However, the real problem is 
not with the research, as in most cases criminologists know (or are ex-
pected to know) how to conduct independent, unbiased research. The real 
problem is with the application of the incorrect and generalised conclu-
sions of some of the above-mentioned reports to policy-making, as this 
may lead to stigmatisation, wrongful accusations and damage to the inter-
ests and humanitarian protection of migrants (Tazzioli, 2016).   
 
The positive image of a smuggler 
 
Instead of recycling law enforcement data and the findings of so-called 
migration experts, empirical criminological research has focused in recent 
years on the activities and business organisation of people smuggling 
around the world, based on interviews with those involved in it (DiNicola 
and Musumeci, 2014; Staring, 2012; Zhang, 2008; Van Liempt, 2010; 
Bilger, Hofmann and Jandl, 2006).  
 Traditionally the phenomenon of irregular migration is deeply rooted 
and embedded in communities (Zhang, 2008) where social ties and trust 
relationships exist as these aspects are crucial to its success. In many com-
munities, relatives, close friends, neighbours and co-villagers all make a 
vital contribution to facilitating the journey and guaranteeing payment. 
Zhang and Chin showed in their studies how entire villages in China were 
involved in planning and supporting smuggling operations (Zhang and 
Chin, 2002). Majid emphasised that community and family ties are key 
factors in the smuggling of people from Afghanistan and Somalia (Majid, 
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2018). Baird shows that trust is the basis of the relationship between mi-
grants and smugglers in Turkey (Bairda, 2016) and Sanchez shows in her 
research how trust is based on ‘socially cemented ties’ in Mexico 
(2015:17). The social embeddedness of human smuggling as a collective 
practice is emphasised by Mengiste (2018) in the context of Eritrean and 
Ethiopian migrants. According to Achilli, the relationships between smug-
glers and migrants are “rich in solidarity and reciprocity and grounded in 
local notions of morality” (Achilli, 2018: 77). Chinese migrants in the US 
even consider their smugglers as philanthropists (Zhang, 2007: 89).  
 The image of the smuggler that emerges from these empirical studies is 
that of a family member, a friend or an acquaintance who can arrange a 
migrant’s journey and make their dream come true. Maher describes how 
in Senegal the smuggler is considered as a friend, protector and guide (Ma-
her, 2018). He is a member of the community, someone who enjoys the 
respect and trust of other migrants. Trust, reputation and personal relation-
ships are thus key factors in understanding migrant smuggling.  
 Members of the community usually consider people smuggling as a le-
gitimate enterprise rather than a criminal activity and regard smugglers as 
well-connected and knowledgeable entrepreneurs. They view illegal peo-
ple smuggling as a strictly rational business with its own specific risks, just 
like any other business, and they ‘silence morality’ (Bauman, 2000: 29). 
Not all smugglers appear to be equally experienced and successful and 
sometimes they fail to complete their mission or make serious and even 
fatal mistakes during the trip. But in many cases, mainly those that are not 
registered in police statistics and do not attract media attention, the smug-
gling operations are successful. These successes reinforce the smuggler’s 
positive image and function as an informal advertisement for recruiting 
new clients.  
 The smuggler as an information and service provider is also often men-
tioned in the literature. Austrian research revealed that smugglers gave mi-
grants information about the legal situation in the destination country and 
practicalities on how to deal with the authorities, even though this infor-
mation was not always correct (Bilger, Hofmann and Jandl, 2006). In his 
research on smuggling along the Mexico-US border, David Spener intro-
duced the term ‘coyote’, meaning professional service providers who help 
migrants to cross the border (2004). These coyotes appear to ‘make sure 
that disasters do not befall the migrants they transport’ (Spencer, 2004: 
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310). Migrants usually choose coyotes who have already proven that they 
are capable of organising a trip by safely transporting other family or com-
munity members (ibid: 311). Migrants perceive their know-how and value 
it as a guarantee for the success of the operation. 
 One of the main reasons why human smugglers are presented as crimi-
nals in the media and the public debate is that they profit from those who 
use their services. The question is whether this should be considered a 
problem. As Castells and Portes (1989) argue, the migrant smuggler is an 
actor engaged in the informal economy, something that usually happens 
when state institutions fail to provide regulations. Other authors have sim-
ilarly emphasised that human smuggling is a market and smugglers are 
economic actors filling a niche that governments cannot provide or regu-
late (Di Nicola and Musumeci, 2014; Zhang, 2008). Achilli (2018) takes 
this a step further in his analysis, arguing that smugglers are not driven 
solely by profit, but mainly by morality and religious duties, when they 
become involved in this illicit enterprise.  
 This type of smuggler appears to contradict the image of smugglers as 
cruel, rapacious criminals who knowingly send people to their death on the 
open seas that is propagated by the media and in the public and political 
debate. This discrepancy in the representation of human smuggler in public 
debate is persistent. Perhaps anti-smuggling officials are turning a blind 
eye to the narratives in the academic literature, or maybe the researchers 
are misinterpreting what they see and hear during their research. The only 
way to understand this discrepancy is to go to the field and communicate 
with the actors involved in human smuggling.  
 
 
Human smuggling on Lesbos 
 
I found the same discrepancy between positive and negative views on hu-
man smuggling during my fieldwork on Lesbos. During this period there 
were reports in the local media that several smugglers had been arrested. It 
was striking that these smugglers were not bringing migrants from Turkey 
to Lesbos, but had been trying to smuggle migrants from the island to the 
mainland or even back to Turkey on private boats or the ferry. One attempt, 
widely reported in the local media, involved a person who was arrested 
while trying to smuggle four migrants onto the ferry on his motorcycle 
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(Lesvosnews.net, 24 July, 2017). There were, however, no reports of hu-
man smuggling from Turkey to Lesbos, as there had been in previous years. 
In 2015-2017 human smuggling activities to Lesbos were frequently men-
tioned in local and social media and police reports. In this period this 
mainly involved the smuggling of migrants from Turkey to Lesbos.  
 During my fieldwork I could distinguish three types of human smug-
gling. Firstly, activities shifted from smuggling people from Turkey to Les-
bos to smuggling them from the island to the Greek mainland. Migrants 
arriving on Lesbos became ‘locked’ there, as according to the Dublin reg-
ulation they have to be registered in the first EU country in which they 
arrive, which was Greece in this case. They had to apply for asylum there, 
even though their real destination was usually somewhere else in Europe. 
Those who did not want to apply for asylum on Lesbos tried to disappear 
into illegality (a difficult feat on an island) and escape to mainland Greece, 
from where they hoped to continue their journey to West Europe illegally 
on land.  
 Secondly, migrants who had already applied for asylum on Lesbos and 
realised that they had no chance of getting it, or who could no longer tol-
erate the long wait for an asylum decision, especially in view of the diffi-
cult conditions in the camps, tried to return to Turkey with the help of 
smugglers in order to look for other possibilities for reaching Europe. In 
principle, they could tell the authorities that they wanted to be voluntarily 
deported back to Turkey, but the deportation process (bureaucratic and 
physical preparations) could take a long time, which obviously they did not 
want to waste. Approaching smugglers to bring them back was a much 
swifter solution.  
 Last, but not least, there were the still regular arrivals of boats carrying 
migrants to Lesbos. The smugglers who had arranged their trip did not 
travel with them, remaining in Turkey and issuing instructions by phone or 
text. Usually their boats were found by Frontex, the Hellenic Coast Guard 
or activist ships (such as Sea Watch), who rescued them and brought them 
ashore.  
 On the basis of police and Frontex information and stories of migrants, 
activists and academic researchers (all personal communication in the sum-




     The local police mainly mentioned organised crime networks, espe-
cially Turkish and Albanian smuggling groups. These groups appeared to 
be particularly active at the start of the ‘refugee crisis’. According to police 
sources, these violent criminal smugglers had no compunction about send-
ing migrants out to sea on defective rubber boats without providing them 
with usable life jackets. In the north of Lesbos, the ‘cemetery’ of thousands 
of abandoned life-jackets, many in children’s sizes and some with visible 
warnings in different languages that they should not be used for swimming, 
still serves as a grim reminder of the dangers of the migrants’ journey. An-
other cemetery, not far from the capital Mytilene, where the ‘unknown’ 
migrants are buried whose bodies were washed ashore on the island, is held 
up as proof  by politicians and media for the involvement of  ruthless crim-
inal smuggling gangs who are only focused on their own profits and do not 
care for the safety of their clients.  
 A second category consisted of immigrants from the same country of 
origin, especially Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis, who were smuggling their 
compatriots and were usually mentioned by migrants themselves.  
 According to Frontex, local police and some migrants, the third cate-
gory consists of so-called ‘guest-smugglers’ who had come to Turkey from 
other countries, such Russia, Georgia and Bulgaria, and successfully ob-
tained the contacts and know-how needed to conduct their operations. 
Members of non-governmental organisations and other charity groups 
were also considered as human smugglers, mainly by the local police and 
residents. ‘Occasional smugglers’ included tourists and fishermen was also 
mentioned by police and local islanders.  
 All these categories can be considered as human smugglers if one ap-
plies the UN or EU definition. Some were involved in the entire process, 
from planning and organising to facilitating the journey. Others, such as 
‘guest-smugglers’, were brokers, who connected migrants with ‘real’ 
smugglers, or arranged false documents. Others, such as members of 
NGOs or tourists or local islanders facilitated some parts of the journey by 
providing migrants with transport, food or shelter. The latter aspect of 
smuggling will be discussed later in this article as an example of crimes of 




Making profits on migrants? 
 
According to a Hellenic Police respondent: “In the last few years, a lot of 
smugglers were caught. There is still smuggling going on this summer, but 
less”. He attributed the decline in the arrests of smugglers to the fact that 
smuggling had become less profitable: “the prices are very low now, be-
tween 300-500 euros”. He explained that the prices had gone down because 
there were fewer migrants who wanted to be smuggled than in the previous 
years, especially in 2015, when the crisis was at its peak and thousands of 
people arrived on the island. 
 The modus operandi had also changed: “The smugglers do not accom-
pany the refugees; they teach them how to operate a boat and send them 
out alone. The smugglers are mostly Turkish, but also Syrian, Moroccan 
and Algerian. The problem of fake documents is huge, especially for mi-
nors. The people who make them are their own nationals”. 
 This information about smugglers provided by a police officer, shows 
a typical business-oriented operation method: prices are fixed according to 
the demand and opportunities created by migration. The decrease in de-
mand for their services means a decrease in the profits. This observation 
definitely contradicts the prevailing idea that human smugglers make huge 
profits on migrants, or that they force them to pay exorbitant prices. 
 It is not human smuggling, but migration in general that can create an 
opportunity for local people to earn sometimes large amounts of money. 
One example of such an opportunity is that of the taxi drivers on Lesbos in 
2015, when thousands of migrants who had landed on the north of the is-
land needed transport to the south-east port of Mytilene in order to continue 
their journey. The local authorities refused to arrange bus services for the 
newcomers and this provided the taxi drivers with a golden opportunity to 
charge excessive rates (around 300-400 euros) for a 70 km trip. In 2015-
16, the price of daily goods and services, such as food, drinks, using the 
toilet or charging your telephone battery was hiked up by local restaurant 
owners and ordinary islanders, who saw an opportunity to earn money 
from the daily needs of newly arrived migrants. They, however, were not 
viewed as human smugglers: they were just trying to make a bit out of these 
migrants.  The latter were victims of a rip off by locals, not by some bad 




The good smuggler? 
 
All of my migrant respondents told me that they had used the services of 
smugglers and were convinced that they would not have been able to reach 
Europe without them. The relationship between smugglers and migrants 
was primarily based on a financial agreement, but often it involved more 
than just money. One respondent told me that his smuggler had tried to 
transport him four times: three times the boat had been caught by the Turk-
ish Coast Guard and returned to the Turkish shore. The smuggler never 
asked for more money, even when the boats were confiscated each time 
they were caught and he actually lost money on the venture. Instead he kept 
trying to smuggle the migrants until he succeeded. According to my re-
spondent: “he promised to bring me to Greece and he kept his promise”. 
According to another respondent, his smuggler knew that he could not af-
ford to pay him much, so he agreed to smuggle him for less money than 
the others and his two young children for free.  
 Another migrant trusted one specific smuggler because of the positive 
experiences his brother and his family had had with him earlier that month. 
Successes serve as a positive advertisement and personal recommendations 
by family members or friends can enhance a smuggler’s reputation. This 
smuggler was careful and delayed the boat’s departure several times be-
cause of bad weather conditions. 
 In these stories, the smuggler came across not as a callous money-mak-
ing machine but as a helpful and understanding person, who was consider-
ate of individual problems and committed to bringing people to the next 
stop of their destination.  
 I also heard several times that smugglers helped migrants to decide on 
a better destination for their customers. When stories about the over-
crowded camps on Lesbos started to dominate media headlines, smugglers 
advised migrants to travel to other islands, such as Kos or Samos. One re-
spondent told me that his smuggler advised him to travel to Chios as there 
were fewer migrants there, meaning shorter waiting times for the asylum 
decision. When my respondent refused because he wanted to reunite with 
his wife and children on Lesbos, the smuggler sent him there. According 
to my respondent, the smuggler “was thinking what would be better for me, 
but I was the one who decided where to go, and he did what I asked”. This 
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example at least is at odds with the stereotype of victimized migrants who 
have no ‘agency’ and are manipulated by smugglers.  
 
Human smuggling out of solidarity 
 
Although facilitating irregular migration is not included in the definition 
of human smuggling, it is often associated with it. Article 1 of the ‘Facili-
tators Package’, composed of Directive 2002/90/EC, establishes a common 
definition of the offence of facilitating unauthorized entry, transit and res-
idence, as does Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA on the strengthening 
of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence (European Commission, 2015). Although no financial 
profit is mentioned in this legislation, it includes a so-called ‘délit de soli-
darité’. Many Europeans have been accused of this delict during the mi-
grant crisis, according to the media reports. 
 Rozakou (2016) described how people were arrested on Lesbos for as-
sisting migrants. The most dramatic case was in January 2016, when the 
Greek police pressed charges carrying prison sentences of up to 10 years 
against a group of Spanish lifeguards for towing a stranded dinghy with 51 
refugees on it near Lesbos (Ekathimerini.com, January 14, 2016). 
 According to local police officers, several NGOs intended in recent 
years to facilitate the smuggling of migrants to Lesbos and there was evi-
dence of contact between smugglers and NGOs, whereby the latter were 
given the precise location of the boats and other information so that they 
could meet migrants before the Greek Coast Guard found them. This was 
denied by my respondents from NGOs, who argued that they had no links 
with smugglers and were “operating only out of humanitarian purposes”. 
The NGO members claimed that these accusations are part of a political 
campaign aimed at getting rid of NGOs on the island. Supposedly, NGOs 
are no longer needed as the ‘refuge crisis’ officially came to an end in 
March 2016 when the EU-Turkish agreement was signed and the authori-
ties assumed control of migrants on the Aegean islands. In 2016-2017 var-
ious NGOs in other countries were accused in the media of cooperating 
with criminal human smuggling networks. Members of Médecins Sans 
Frontières, for example, were accused by Frontex of colluding with crim-
inals and being “responsible for more deaths at sea” (Sigona, 2017). 
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 Most of my respondents were not aware that they were committing a 
crime by helping migrants; they had never heard of these EU laws and they 
could not identify themselves with criminal human smugglers and mem-
bers of organised crime who harm their victims or exploit them for profit.  
 Both international volunteers helping migrants on Lesbos and local 
people giving migrants food and dry clothes were faced with a dilemma as 
their desire to help the needy was in direct contravention of their duty to 
obey the law, which forbade any such assistance. As a local resident ex-
plained to me:  
 
“These poor people need my help, and I want to help, but my govern-
ment prohibits me from doing this. What shall I do: follow my heart or 
follow my brain, because I don’t want to go to prison?” 
  
 
Human smuggling reconsidered 
 
When there is such a huge discrepancy between official reports and ac-
counts given by respondents in different studies on smuggling, including 
the present one, the effect of criminalising human smuggling in order to 
combat ‘organised crime’ must be doubted. It can harm individuals who 
facilitate illicit travel, and sometimes the punishments may seem highly 
disproportionate (Weber and Grewcock, 2012). Continuing to consider hu-
man smuggling as a crime cannot solve the more important problems of 
the recent migration. Human smugglers, labelled as criminals, have be-
come scapegoats for inefficient migration policies around the world. It is 
they who are blamed for all the misery at sea, not the EU officials who are 
failing to look for root causes and solutions in the migrants’ countries of 
origin and who are neither willing nor able to give them a decent reception 
in Europe. However, as many empirical studies have shown, ‘cracking 
down on smugglers’ does not deter migrants from trying to reach Europe. 
Human smuggling is a response to the increase in border controls and re-
strictive legislation. In the recent crisis in migration policies in the EU 
when hundreds of thousands of people were fleeing war, ethnic conflict or 
economic misery, human smuggling was unavoidable. Humanitarian assis-
tance is also an old and unavoidable phenomenon, as there have always 
been people prepared to break the law in order to save the lives of others. 
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The criminalisation of both human smuggling and facilitating irregular mi-
gration must therefore be reconsidered. Empirical research from all over 
the world has revealed plenty of negative consequences of such criminali-
sation.  
 The idea of reconsidering human smuggling as a criminal activity is not 
new. Smuggling is already being discussed in academic literature as a 
‘travel business’ with ‘service providers’ (Zhang, 2007), and as a transna-
tional service industry’ (Bilger, Hofmann, and Jandl, 2006) with specific 
tasks assigned to ‘brokers’, ‘fixers’, or ‘pushers’ (Berg and Tamagno, 
2013; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sorensen, 2013; Lucht, 2013). This broker-
age can be viewed as a business with customers to “shape transactions be-
tween migrants and smugglers in ways that are highly pronounced in travel 
and transit” (Ahmad, 2011, p. 7). 
 Regulation and acceptance of the historical fact that people have always 
been moving from one place to another in order to escape misery, be it 
political, social or economic and to search for better perspectives and op-
portunities could provide a real alternative to the failing struggle against 
alleged ‘organised networks’ of human smugglers. The prevailing stereo-
types of cruel and greedy criminals sending their victims to their deaths 
continues to persist: it is such a convenient and politically accepted concept 
in policy papers, certainly if combined with ‘organised crime’. The tragic 
media images of accidents at sea, the governmental reports and often ex-
aggerated estimations of harm and victims in addition to the statements 
issued by moral entrepreneurs who have never talked to either smugglers 
or migrants make it more difficult for policy-makers to open their mind 
and search for better definitions and legislation for this phenomenon. 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I asked why people use the services of 
criminals. During my fieldwork I realised that human smugglers to Lesbos 
were not considered as criminals, at least not by the migrants who had been 
smuggled. On the contrary, the smugglers were seen as important helpers 
who had made it possible for them to fulfil their dream of reaching Europe. 
I also realised that there are many types of smugglers, ranging from the 
stereotypical images of organised criminals, as they are perceived by the 
police, to friends, compatriots, and even members of NGOs. Generalising 
these types and groups does not help us to understand or respond to this 
phenomenon. Political decision making must never rest upon abstract, im-
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precise knowledge. Empirical research, therefore, is vital for decision mak-
ers. Human smuggling (including crimes of solidarity) should be regulated, 
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l’intégration et de la migration international, 2004, Vol. 5 (3), pp. 295-
320. 
Spener, D., Global Apartheid, Coyotaje, and the Discourse of Clandestine 
Migration: Distinction between Personal, Structural and Cultural Vio-
lence. In: Kyle, D. and R. Koslowski (eds.), Global Human Smuggling. 
Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
Press, pp. 157-185, 2011. 
Tazzioli, M., Border displacements. Challenging the politics of rescue be-
tween Mare Nostrum and Triton. Migration Studies, 2016, 4(1), pp. 1–
19. 
UNODC, Transnational crime. Human smuggling, 2019, on: 
https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/migrant-smuggling.html 
U.S. State Department, Human trafficking and human smuggling. Under-
standing the difference, Washington, DC: Office to Monitor and Com-
bat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. State Department, 2017. 
Walser, R., J. Baker McNeill, J. Zuckerman, The human tragedy of illegal 
immigration: greater efforts needed to combat smuggling and violence. 
Backgrounder, 2011, No. 2568 June 22, pp. 1-18. 
Zhang, S., Smuggling and trafficking in human beings: All roads lead to 
America. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007.  
Zhang, S., G. Sanchez and L. Achilli (eds.). Migrant smuggling as a col-
lective strategy and insurance policy: views from the margins. The An-
nals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2018, 
676 (1). 
 
  
